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Millennialism with and without the violence: an examination of late twentieth century 
Japanese new religions (or why Aum is rather unique in Japan) 
 
Introduction: Aum and the 'danger' of religion 
Aum Shinrikyō, it is fair to say, has given millennialism a bad name and made it an 
unattractive strategic option for contemporary religions in Japan. It has also fostered 
the view that religion is dangerous, prone to violence and in need of state monitoring 
and control. Indeed, one aftermath of the 'Aum Affair' (Ōmu jiken) has been 
widespread speculation in the media and elsewhere not about whether other religious 
movements might potentially be violent, but about which one(s) would be the next to 
follow suit and become the 'next Aum', along with assumptions that movements that 
express millennial visions are particularly prone to violence.  
 
Aum was not the only group to have been involved in dramatic and violent events in 
the latter part of the last century in Japan. Others include the communal suicide of 
seven devotees of the small Christian-oriented group Michi no Tomo Kyōkai 真理の
友協会 in Wakayama in November 1986 after the death of their leader Miyamoto 
Seiji, in order to 'follow' him to the next world and the killing, between December 
1994 and June 1995, of six people associated with a small religious group in 
Sukagawa, Fukushima prefecture led by the diviner/healer and exorcist Etō Sachiko, 
who was later charged with murder, tried and executed for these deeds.    
 
It was, however, the Aum case—dramatic because of its public nature, the scale of 
Aum's criminal activities, and its manufacture and use of 'weapons of mass 
destruction'—that captured public, political, security and law enforcement attention 
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both in Japan and internationally. In Japan the impact of the affair has been seismic. 
Religious affiliation, in decline prior to March 1995, fell further afterwards, trust in 
religious organisations has dropped heavily, and suspicion of and antipathy to religion 
has increased significantly. Since 1995, the predominant public images of religion as 
articulated in surveys, have been of it as something 'dangerous' , associated with 'mind 
control' and manipulation, and in need of close scrutiny and state control, to the extent 
that many religious groups (including established Buddhist organisation) report that 
they feel they are being tarred with the same brush as Aum. Government responses to 
such support for public regulation of religion (which in some surveys indicates large 
majorities favouring the prohibition of religious proselytisation in public) have 
included reforms of the Religious Corporations Law aimed at deterring potential 
future violence and simultaneously expanding the government's own powers. In 1999 
the Victims Compensation Law and the Organizational Control Law—directed at 
Aum but with implications for other groups—imposed rigorous controls on the 
remnants of Aum, requiring it (and groups linked to it) to allow inspection of their 
facilities and submit lists of their assets and membership every three months. Japan's 
Public Intelligence Security Agency has continued to monitor Aum and has changed 
its counterterrorism efforts and strategies to the extent that it now regularly portrays 
religious movements as potential threats.  
 
Religion in Japan, after Aum, is, in other words, widely viewed as potentially 
dangerous and requiring surveillance and monitoring, rather than as any sort of 
potentially positive entity. Perhaps this suspicion of religion and its being linked to 
other social problems and threats was best illustrated by new laws on safe internet 
usage passed in 2009, which outlined a number of categories of websites that should 
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be blocked from access by people below adult majority age. They included terrorism, 
pornography, gambling, 'cults' (karuto) and religion (shūkyō)—not just thereby 
placing religion in the same category as these other phenomena but leading to the 
ironic result that schoolchildren on traditional shūgaku ryokō trips to Kyoto to learn 
about Japanese culture and historical traditions, were unable to access, on their cell-
phones, the websites of temples they were going to visit.  
 
For some religious organisations, such hostility is further manifest in what they see as 
civil rights violations being committed against their members, along with the 
tendency of public authorities such as the police to turn a blind eye to such things and 
even to potentially criminal acts against their number. This issue was raised most 
recently by the report by Human Rights Without Frontiers, sent to the UN Convention 
on Human Rights in Geneva, indicating how cases of criminal abduction and forcible 
deprogramming of members of groups such as Unification Church and the Jehovah's 
Witnesses, were being disregarded by the authorities, seemingly because the groups 
concerned were themselves regarded as problematic. The impact of the affair has led 
to other movements changing their teachings and drawing back from their earlier 
millennial orientations while any group that appears to behave or dress in ways that 
look 'strange'—especially if they espouse millennial beliefs—has come under 
suspicion and in some cases been widely harassed because of fears—often stirred up 
by the mass media—that they might be the 'next Aum'. 
 
This notion of the 'next Aum' has helped keep alive the idea that future violence by a 
religious group is inevitable, while simultaneously causing harassment to groups 
'identified' under this rubric. The most striking example here was Panawave, whose 
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leader, Chino Yūko, had made prophecies of forthcoming environmental crisis 
(predicted for 2003) and millennial change. This coupled with Panawave's itinerant 
communal lifestyle, apparent dependency on a charismatic leader who was believed to 
be sick, and (to the media) eccentric behaviour (which included uniformly dressing in 
white robes, which made the media suspect everyone in the group was clone-like and 
'mind-controlled') led to a mass media furore and to claims from the police that this 
was a nascent terror group. The widespread popular media portrayal of Aum as a 
'doomsday cult' has thus been projected on to other groups such as Panawave and 
created the impression that any movement with millennial and apocalyptic teachings 
is necessarily dangerous and oriented towards social disruption and violence.  
 
Such attitudes resonated beyond Japan as well. Aum has, rightly, been seen as an 
example, along with several others that arose in the late twentieth century in other 
parts of the globe, of the potentiality for certain forms of millennial movement—
especially those that are communal and that regard catastrophic events as a necessary 
precursor to world salvation—to become externally or internally violent. Others often 
analysed within this context alongside Aum are the Peoples Temple, initially an 
American Christian movement that imploded in murder and suicide at Jonestown, 
Guyana in 1978, the Branch Dravidians involved in the Waco siege and conflagration 
of 1993, the Order of the Solar Temple involved in suicides and murders in 
Switzerland and Canada between 1994 and 1997, the suicides of Heaven's Gate in 
California (1997) and the murders of some and collective suicide of other devotees of 
the Movement for the Restoration of the Ten Commandments of God , in Uganda in 
2000.  
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In public order contexts, too, the Aum case has been influential beyond Japan. Aum 
was regarded by law enforcement, security and counter-terrorism agencies around the 
world as a 'must study' example of what—in the late twentieth century—was seen as a 
prevailing and pernicious threat to public order: aggressive millennial movements 
expecting or hoping to trigger an apocalypse and social mayhem in preparation for the 
advent of a new age. It featured in reports by the FBI and other agencies concerned 
about the 'threat' of millennial movements at the end of the last century, and was 
described in one such report, in 1999, by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service 
as a 'textbook' case of how millennial religious movements were liable to become 
violent. Aum's development of chemical and biological weapons, which many 
security agencies took as a sign that such things would become a norm in future 
terrorist contexts, appeared to be seen more as a future norm than an unique and 
anomalous act, while it was cited frequently by US policy makers as an example—
alongside Al Qaeda—of ‘the killing power of religion’ and of unrestrained mass 
terrorism on the part of religiously-motivated actors.  
 
It was also cited by the Chinese government as a legitimation for its crackdowns on 
religious groups it deemed to be contrary to its ideological values—notably Falun 
Gong, the subject of repression in 1999 after it had staged demonstrations in Beijing. 
The Chinese government responded by tightening its laws against religious groups 
and banning ‘evil cults’, among which it included Falun Gong. The widespread 
protests, notably in the USA, against these actions was met with a unified response 
from Chinese authorities, in which the example of Aum was repeatedly used to 
'demonstrate' the lethal nature of religion. Renmin Ribao, the state's/party's official 
newspaper, portrayed Falun Gong as a Chinese version of Aum that had to be curbed 
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before it attacked and killed people and then-Chinese President Jiang Zemin stated 
that Falun Gong was ‘as dangerous as Japan’s Aum cult, which released poison gas in 
the Tokyo metro in 1995’. Chinese authorities argued that examples such as Aum 
happened when 'corrupt' Western-style 'democracy' is adopted and freedom of religion 
granted to all. This, the Chinese government said, opened the way for ‘cults’ that, like 
Aum, threaten social order and seek to create chaos.  
 
Millennialism and the issue of (non)violence 
The irony of this is that, even as it has been seen as a prime exemplar of the 'danger' 
of religion within the country and become a 'textbook case' beyond Japan, that has 
justifiably been studied in conjunction with other cases of violence among apocalyptic 
new movements in late twentieth century religious terms, Aum was far more of an 
anomaly in Japanese terms than anything else. This is especially so in the context of 
millennialism, a characteristic widely accepted as seminal to Aum's turn to violence 
and identified by many in Japan as a 'danger signal' indicating that a movement might 
be 'another Aum' and implying that being millennial in effect means being a 
'doomsday cult' bent on bringing out some form of apocalyptic scenario. This point 
about Aum being anomaly will be clear when one looks at other examples of Japanese 
new religions that were millennial in orientation.  
 
First it is important to note that although the term 'millennialism' initially developed in 
Christian contexts and especially centred on interpretations of the Book of Revelation 
in which Jesus' second coming is linked to the advent of a new spiritual age when 
Jesus will lead the army of the good and righteous in a final battle (Armageddon) to 
destroy Satan and the forces of evil, it is not a concept specific to that tradition. Rather, 
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millennialism in conceptual terms is found in various modes and terminologies across 
various religious and cultural traditions; it is found in Islamic, Jewish and Zoroastrian 
traditions, as well as eastern contexts such as in Chinese and Japanese Buddhism. It 
has been particularly prevalent also in the new religions that have emerged around the 
world especially in the latter part of the twentieth century.  
 
Often, too, such millennial movements have emphasised an apocalyptic dimension, in 
which the coming of the new spiritual dawn was to be accompanied or prefaced by 
cataclysmic end-of-the-world scenarios, ranging from cosmic wars between good and 
evil, to pestilences, plagues, natural disasters and environmental degradation. As such, 
many millennial movements have viewed destruction as a necessary and even 
welcome concomitant to and precursor of spiritual world transformation and revival. 
In such apocalyptic scenarios, those who are seen as barriers to the realisation of the 
new dawn are often portrayed in particularly dramatic terms, as deserving to be 
punished and killed. In Aum's millennial scenarios, all who opposed its 'truth' were 
deemed shinri no teki 'enemies of the truth' who could be 'justifiably' destroyed in the 
transition to the new realm, while the cosmic struggle Aum was engaged in involved a 
massive conspiracy of evil forces that opposed its truth. In this cosmic war scenario, 
Aum's adherents were seen as sacred warriors fighting for truth, while anyone not 
with Aum was guilty of being in or tacitly supporting that conspiracy. They were the 
enemy and could be punished as such. Such perceptions are rather common among 
apocalyptics, as is evident not just in Aum's modern day militants, but in the attitudes 
of the medieval millennialists of central Europe, memorably discussed by Norman 
Cohn in his book The Pursuit of the Millennium, who, Cohn, says, killed anyone who 
opposed them 'with impunity' because they thought they had the right to punish 
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anyone who stood in the way of their religious mission. Studies of contemporary 
Muslim apocalyptic literature show similar themes, in which a vast Jewish conspiracy 
led by the Antichrist against Islam is a recurrent feature, along with calls for Muslims 
to fight this conspiracy in order to bring about an ideal Muslim realm. This conspiracy, 
however, is not just Jewish in nature; everyone is involved in this conflict; such 
literature decrees there are no non-combatants in this context. Anyone not fighting on 
behalf of Islam is fighting against it—a polarised vision that was evident in Aum's 
views of the world and recurrent in apocalyptic scenarios across the religious 
spectrum.  
 
Millennialism, however, need not be expressly violent. While images of destruction as 
a precursor to the advent of a new spiritual age and as a way of cleansing this world of 
its wrongs, may be a recurrent them in the teachings of millennial groups, this does 
not mean that they necessarily cling to a 'doomsday' scenario or that the 'doomsday 
cult' label that the media is so keen to utilise, is appropriately used across the board. 
Contemporary scholars in the study of new religions and of contemporary 
millennialism, for instance, tend to recognise two strands (that at times interact) of 
millennialism, referred to as progressive and catastrophic millennialism. In the former, 
the advent of the new spiritual age comes through the progressive work of humans— 
perhaps with divine assistance or led by an inspired saviour-like figure—who are able 
to transform this world and realise the salvific new world without recourse to or the 
need for a cataclysmic chain of events. This does not mean that progressive 
millennialists necessarily eschew violence altogether, however, so much as they do 
not see it as an essential component of progression to a new age.  
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This contrasts to catastrophic millennialism (the apocalyptic or 'doomsday' scenario), 
which centres around the belief that cataclysm and destruction are necessary factors in 
and agencies for the realisation of the millennial condition of collective salvation. 
Thus, a cosmic war or confrontation as in the Book of Revelation's image of 
Armageddon, and the final battle of good and evil, or a series of natural disasters that 
may be initiated by a supreme deity and/or by natural forces but that may also require 
a human engagement (such as, for example, taking part in a final war or insurrection 
to overthrow an oppressive materialistic civilisation), are typical elements in 
catastrophic millennial thought. These two categories—progressive and catastrophic 
millennialism—are not exclusive and at times the one may contain elements of the 
latter. Aum, for example, initially was optimistic and oriented towards a progressive 
millennial stance that became increasingly pessimistic and inclined towards the 
catastrophic the more it became embroiled in conflicts and problems. One of its rivals 
in the 1980s and 1990s, Kōfuku no Kagaku, embraced aspects of catastrophic 
millennialism but infused this also with aspects of optimistic progressive millennial 
thought, the latter of which gradually emerged as its most potent strand, just as Aum's 
shifted the other way. However, it is largely if not exclusively the case in millennial 
contexts that only those movements that have thoroughly espoused a catastrophic 
stance—as Aum had by the early 1990s, when it began to view 'Armageddon' as 
inevitable—are likely to become violent. This is evident when one looks further at the 
tradition of Japanese millennialism in the new religions.  
  
 
 
 
Nu
ma
ta 
Co
nf
ere
nc
e i
n B
ud
dh
ist
 St
ud
ies
 at
 th
e U
ni
ve
rsi
ty
 of
 H
aw
ai‘
i a
t M
ān
oa
, M
ar
ch
 20
–2
1, 
20
14
 
Vi
ole
nc
e, 
No
nv
iol
en
ce,
 an
d J
ap
an
ese
 R
eli
gio
ns
: P
as
t, 
Pr
ese
nt
, a
nd
 Fu
tu
re 
Pl
ea
se 
ac
kn
ow
led
ge
 th
e s
ou
rce
 of
 th
is 
pa
pe
r a
nd
 do
 no
t q
uo
te 
wi
th
ou
t t
he
 au
th
or
's 
pe
rm
iss
ion
 10 
Japanese millennialism and the new religions 
While millennial concepts in various forms have been a theme of Japanese religious 
history it has been with the new religions that emerged from the nineteenth century 
onwards that the most significant modern modes of millennialism (sennen ōkoku 
shugi) have occurred. They have often been associated with the notion of yonaoshi 
(healing/transforming this world; also translated as world renewal) at times in 
progressive and peaceful contexts but also at times with potentially catastrophic 
dimensions. Nakayama Miki, in Tenrikyō, provides one example of the former mode 
of millennialism with her progressive millennial visions of world renewal and 
transformation, in which she taught that a new era of bliss would envelop the world 
through the medium of sacred nectar descending from heaven onto earth at Tenri.  
 
Other millennial new religions were less benign, at least early on. Deguchi Nao's 
Ōmoto, for example, when it developed in the late nineteenth century, initially had a 
millennial vision in which the world was to be upturned and transformed (tatekai 
tatenaoshi) in ways in which violent destruction was a significant element in and 
precursor to the realisation of a new spiritual dawn. A crucial theme in her millennial 
visions was hostility to modern forces, materialism and influences from outside Japan; 
it was highly xenophobic, anti-modern, and nationalistic in nature. Yet despite Nao's 
aggressive hostility to the modern world, and her yearning for a return to an idealised 
agrarian society, her millennialism in the end turned away from challenging the 
existing order, especially after Ōmoto—after the 1921 Ōmoto incident—underwent 
transformation as her son-in-law Deguchi Onisaburō became more influential in the 
movement. Effectively as Ōmoto grew under his dynamic leadership, and as it 
became more urbanised and cosmopolitan in nature (using, inter alia, the fruits of the 
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modern world Nao so despised, such as the mass media, in order to expand and 
promote its message) it turned away from violent imagery and towards a more 
benevolent millennialism.  
 
The virulence of Nao's denunciations of the world and the seeming embrace of 
destruction as a mechanism for bringing about world renewal (yonaoshi) were evident 
also in the emergence of Tenshō Kōtai Jingūkyō in the later years of World War Two. 
Its founder and leader Kitamura Sayo denounced society, calling it the 'maggot world' 
uji no sekai 蛆の世界 and referring to those who ruled/oversaw it (notably those who 
had led Japan to a war she saw as disastrous) as 'maggot beggars' uji no kojiki 蛆の乞
食—insults directed especially against Japan's then-rulers and the emperor. Kitamura 
attacked all manner of people—from the emperor to other religions—who she deemed 
as spiritually impure, while prophesying that the world renewal she sought was based 
on the necessary collapse of the current order, which would be destroyed in 'furious 
flames' to bring about the creation of a 'kingdom of god' and the salvation for those 
who listened to her message. Such dramatic images of millennial transformation 
clearly fitted, as did Deguchi Nao's, into a catastrophic framework, yet Tenshō Kōtai 
Jingūkyō, like Ōmoto, soon turned away from prophesying (and seemingly hoping 
for) such violence. This transformation of Kitamura's millennial visions was linked to 
the seemingly successful nature of her prophecies—intrinsic to her millennial visions 
—that Japan would lose the war. When Japan surrendered this appeared to affirm her 
status as a prophet and helped to heighten her popularity and that of her new 
movement—factors that tempered the initially severe critiques she had made. 
Moreover, Japan's war defeat appeared to signal the demise of the immediate social 
order (and the maggot beggars who led it) she had most overtly fulminated against. 
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The change of regime, too, enabled her to carry out her missionary activities without 
the repression of the war years. As a result, the conditions in which catastrophic 
millennial visions seemed relevant and appealing, diminished, and the movement 
became more clearly focused not so much on talking of destruction but of establishing 
the grounds for its envisioned new world order by building, at Tabuse in Yamaguchi 
prefecture, a religious centre to serve as its earthly symbol of the new world order and 
its utopia on earth.  
  
These earlier new millennial new religions were initially rural in origin and built 
around an agrarian image of how things should be, and while they grew among the 
urbanised population of twentieth century Japan, their appeal was primarily to those 
grounded an agricultural and rural lifestyle. By the latter part of the twentieth century, 
their position as the most significant millennial movements in Japan had been taken 
over by new waves of millennial new religions that appealed to a different audience 
from earlier, rurally oriented and anti-modern new religions such as Ōmoto under 
Deguchi Nao and Tenshō Kōtai Jingūkyō. The late twentieth century millennial 
movements tended to be urban-based, highly attuned to modernity and with an appeal 
to disaffected and highly educated professionals; many of Aum's devotees, for 
example, were professionals such as doctors, lawyers and engineer, often with well-
paid professional jobs. Their anomie and desire for world transformation came not 
from feeling oppressed, marginalised, shut out or on the wrong side of widening 
economic gulfs as society changed—as many of those who initially turned to earlier 
millennial movements such as Ōmoto had been—but the reverse; they largely had 
benefitted from them. They were also comfortable in many ways with modernity, 
using their skills with computers, for example, to generate funds for their movement, 
Nu
ma
ta 
Co
nf
ere
nc
e i
n B
ud
dh
ist
 St
ud
ies
 at
 th
e U
ni
ve
rsi
ty
 of
 H
aw
ai‘
i a
t M
ān
oa
, M
ar
ch
 20
–2
1, 
20
14
 
Vi
ole
nc
e, 
No
nv
iol
en
ce,
 an
d J
ap
an
ese
 R
eli
gio
ns
: P
as
t, 
Pr
ese
nt
, a
nd
 Fu
tu
re 
Pl
ea
se 
ac
kn
ow
led
ge
 th
e s
ou
rce
 of
 th
is 
pa
pe
r a
nd
 do
 no
t q
uo
te 
wi
th
ou
t t
he
 au
th
or
's 
pe
rm
iss
ion
 13 
and using their knowledge, training and computing skills to discover and implement 
the processes of acquiring materials and making weapons. What caused the anomie 
and dissidence of Aum devotees was their feeling that despite the material benefits 
that modern society had given them, it left a deep spiritual void that left them not just 
dissatisfied but deeply hostile. They believed that 'the system stinks' (a theme 
illustrated as a motivating factor in another religious movement in the modern day 
and discussed at this conference by Helen Baroni) and needed radical change—a point 
evident in various writings by members (and ex-members) of Aum, such as the doctor 
(and one of the subway attackers) Hayashi Ikuo, for whom career success and 
Japanese materialism left him cold and empty and for whom something deeper was 
sought.  
 
The millennialism of the late twentieth century, evident in movements such as Kōfuku 
no Kagaku, Mahikari, Agonshū, Byakkō Shinkōkai and Aum Shinrikyō, was also 
conditioned by some different factors contingent not just on anomie but also a very 
real fear that the world was in crisis and that forces that had the potential to cause 
mass destruction were close at hand. There was a genuine sense that nuclear 
weaponry either through war or accidents could presage mass destruction (a theme 
especially intense in Japan because of its atomic experiences) and that ecological 
crisis and environmental collapse were really serious concerns for the world. Such 
fears were especially underpinned, too, by the feeling, expressed in a variety of 
sources, that the advent of the calendrical millennium would be the time for such a 
denouement. This was exacerbated in Japan by the popularity (and mistranslations) of 
the prophecies of Nostradamus that both seemed to indicate an end yet also to promise 
potential salvation (a theme picked up by several Japanese new religions and their 
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leaders, notably Agonshū, Aum and Kōfuku no Kagaku), and a growing awareness 
among new religions of wider prophetic themes of apocalypse and end times 
elsewhere. Aum, for instance, picked up on the prevalence of apocalyptic thought that 
permeated aspects of the Christian tradition, along with the Nostradamus prophecies 
that appeared to indicate a world crisis by the end of the twentieth century. Such 
themes were not restricted just to Japanese new religions; they were found repeatedly 
among new movements around the world in the last decades of the last century 
leading up to the calendrical millennium.  
 
Different paths of millennialism in late 20th century Japan 
Some of these movements, while espousing millennial teachings and talking of the 
world in crisis, were clearly located on the progressive end of the millennial spectrum. 
Agonshū, to take one example, talked about the end of the century as a turning point, 
and about various spiritual problems being created because of karmic unease in the 
world. In 1981, Kiriyama had discussed a coming crisis in his book 1999 nen karuma 
to reishō kara no dasshutsu (Escape from Harmful Spirits and the Karma of 1999) but 
posited himself and his movement as the solution to this looming problem. Drawing 
on its reading of Nostradamus that a saviour would emerge from the East to lead the 
world into a new age, and proclaiming it had discovered, through its rituals and 
Kiriyama Seiyū's 'discovery' of new truths in his understandings of Buddhism, 
Agonshū argued that it could overcome the world's problems and tribulations through 
its peaceful rituals and an active, yet pacific, path of action and faith. Its seeming 
success in attracting followers and mass attention, especially in the late 1980s, also 
enabled it to adhere to this optimistic message, while its massive public ritual 
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performances both in Japan and elsewhere (mainly in the Pacific region) offered (to 
its followers) tangible evidence that it was acting to solve the crisis it prophesied.  
 
The movements that appeared to offer a different interpretation of the end of the 
century and the coming of the millennium were Aum and Kōfuku no Kagaku, both of 
which articulated catastrophic prophecies as precursors to the advent of a new realm 
at the turn of the century. Indeed, there is evidence that these two movements were 
competing with each other for attention and support and that this led both to intensify 
the dramatic nature of their millennial prophecies in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Aum's catastrophic prophecies—culminating in its declarations from 1993 onwards 
that a final and real war was inevitable and that (as Asahara stated in January 1995) 
this would be triggered in 1995—are well known. Yet for some time its violent 
imagery was reflected also in that of Kōfuku no Kagaku, with its leader Ōkawa 
Ryūhō stating that wars, pestilence and earthquakes would reduce the world's 
population by as much as 70% by the end of the century, that a third world war would 
start in 1999, nuclear wars would decimate the population of the Middle East, the 
west coast of America would subside into the Ocean, a fourth world war would then 
erupt in China and lead to the destruction of Russia, and that the population of the 
world would be reduced to one-third of its present level. However, such disasters 
would herald the dawning of a new age, in which his spiritually charged followers 
would form the vanguard of a new era.  
 
Although Kōfuku no Kagaku appeared thus to manifest some similarly 'doomsday'—
like themes not dissimilar from Aum's, its trajectory was very different from that of its 
rival. While Aum began by expressing an optimistic progressive millennialism that 
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turned catastrophic, Kōfuku no Kagaku went in a different direction, with catastrophe 
gradually transformed into optimism. Partly this was because Kōfuku no Kagaku, 
although on one level apparently centred on visions of disaster, was never wholly 
oriented towards the catastrophic. Indeed, the catastrophic aspects of its prophecies 
might have been as much strategic as anything else, designed to attract members 
worried about the state of the world, rather than visions that (as was the case in Aum's 
later prophetic turn to violence) became desired outcomes. The seemingly strategic 
dimension of Kōfuku no Kagaku's catastrophic millennial prophecies was, indeed, 
affirmed for me during a lengthy series of interviews with senior officials and 
spokespeople at the movement's main Tokyo temple in November 2013. In these 
interviews I raised the question of whether the movement had undergone a full 
transformation from catastrophic-style prophecies to a more benign vision of the 
progressive millennialist disposition during the early 1990s, and the response was that 
the transformation had not really taken place in such clear terms. Rather, the 
spokespeople said, the movement had never fully embraced the notion of necessary or 
inevitable catastrophe, so much as it had raised the possibilities thereof as a means 
and a strategy to make people think more clearly about the future. It was, in effect, a 
means to wake people out of what Kōfuku regarded as an unknowing stupor and 
indifference to spiritual engagement. 
 
As such, Kōfuku's position appears to be that while some discussion and prophecy 
about catastrophic end-times was prevalent in earlier Kōfuku publications and in 
sermons by its leader, these were largely warning signs designed to persuade people 
of the need to change their ways, than being explicit expectations of disaster and 
violence. Such catastrophic events and violence were not, as such, ever considered 
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essential or welcomed events that would help fulfil a higher purpose or mission 
(unlike with Aum).  
 
Another element that also mitigated against an absolutely catastrophic dimension to 
its teachings, was that Kōfuku no Kagaku—like many other millennialist new 
religions in Japan—had an overtly nationalist dimension to its teachings. While 
Ōkawa spoke of destruction and wars that would wreck some parts of the world, he 
also repeatedly posited Japan as an answer to such disasters; it , along with parts of 
South-east Asia and Indonesia, would survive, while new lands, which he equates 
with the lost continents of Mu and Atlantis that figure prominently in much New Age 
writing, would arise from the sea to form a basis for advanced civilisations. In the 
immediate future Japan would stand out as a beacon, as the light through which the 
new civilization will come. Crisis was thus the signpost for Japanese triumph in which 
it would 'shine like the sun' and provide spiritual leadership to the world. Such ideas 
had an immense appeal to younger Japanese people who saw in them an implicit 
rejection of the overarching cultural influences of Westernisation and, especially of 
the USA which, although an ally is seen as a major cultural threat in Japan. These 
messages appear also in Ōkawa’s 'conversations' with Nostradamus with the result 
that –unlike the apocalyptic disasters prophesied in Aum's understandings of 
Nostradamus's prophecies – Kōfuku’s Nostradamus messages became promises of a 
new utopian era of happiness. In this process Japan would become the spiritual centre 
of the world as well as the new force that overcomes all other countries.  
 
This underlying optimistic nationalist dimension is one that is found in much of 
Japanese late-twentieth century millennialism, and that offers a counterbalancing 
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dimension to its seeming visions of destruction, war and imminent danger. Agonshū's 
sense of mission to the rest of the world states that spiritual revival will come from 
Japan and from its visions that it is building a new 'Buddha realm' in Japan that will 
then be spread to the rest of the world. Byakkō Shinkōkai (another late-twentieth 
century millennial movement) suggests that Japan is the holy land from which peace 
will spread to the rest of the world, and Kōfuku no Kagaku sees Japan as the emergent 
world power that will shine forth in the next century to save humanity. This 
Japanocentric focus (which is manifested also by the reassertion of more traditional 
Japanese cosmological views such as those concerning the role of the spirits of the 
dead, as is evident in Agonshū's rituals for the pacification of spirits) is a means of 
articulating a renewed sense of Japanese identity in the face of change that can also be 
seen as a reworking, in a contemporary context, of religious nationalism. As such it 
proved attractive to many in the later years of the last century—a pattern of success 
that itself served to soften any potential for violent aggression and that worked against 
the degree of social alienation and hostility that led, in the context of Aum, towards 
violence.  
 
Millennial movements such as Agonshū and Kōfuku were this in a sense following in 
the footsteps of earlier movements such as Ōmoto and Tenshō Kōtai Jingūkyō by 
positing that salvation and transformation would come from Japan. They were thus— 
while drawing attention to potential crisis and danger—in reality preaching, an 
optimistic message in terms of the position of Japan. This was something different 
from what happened in Aum, which eschewed such nationalism; for Aum, in a real 
sense, Japan was not a positive entity and leader of the coming new order. Rather, it 
formed an aspect of the enemy against whom the final war should be fought, while 
Nu
ma
ta 
Co
nf
ere
nc
e i
n B
ud
dh
ist
 St
ud
ies
 at
 th
e U
ni
ve
rsi
ty
 of
 H
aw
ai‘
i a
t M
ān
oa
, M
ar
ch
 20
–2
1, 
20
14
 
Vi
ole
nc
e, 
No
nv
iol
en
ce,
 an
d J
ap
an
ese
 R
eli
gio
ns
: P
as
t, 
Pr
ese
nt
, a
nd
 Fu
tu
re 
Pl
ea
se 
ac
kn
ow
led
ge
 th
e s
ou
rce
 of
 th
is 
pa
pe
r a
nd
 do
 no
t q
uo
te 
wi
th
ou
t t
he
 au
th
or
's 
pe
rm
iss
ion
 19 
Aum expressed hostile attitudes to Japanese society and culture, as indeed, its very 
assumption of foreign (Indian) dress and names for its leading lights, suggests. 
Singularly among the milleniallist groups of its era, Aum seems to have taken the 
view that Japan itself, and Japanese culture, were so corrupt as to be damned. Aum 
(although regarding Japan as the place where people would survive the coming 
catastrophe because that was where Aum members were) had no interest in the notion 
of Japan shining like the sun to lead the world out of chaos. What it sought was a total 
overthrow of contemporary Japanese materialism and society, through violent 
destruction that would clear the way for the realisation of its idealised spiritual future 
realm ruled by Asahara's teachings.  
  
In contrast to Aum, while Agonshū and Kōfuku no Kagaku implied that radical 
change was needed to save the world before the end of the century, neither embraced 
catastrophe as an essential and welcomed affair or of constructing enclaves within 
which to enact their ideas. They did not see the country where they operated as a 
battlefield and an enemy, so much as a source of millennial leadership and optimism. 
Like early new religions they had mechanisms within their teachings and structures 
that enabled them to negotiate the millennium without overt social confrontation. 
Partly this was down to success and an orientation towards the idea of Japan as a 
special nation but also (a theme that needs to be explored more fully elsewhere) 
because they, unlike Aum, focused on accessible and open practices. Whereas Aum 
emphasised asceticism and renunciation—notions that in effect made it into a very 
difficult path for the few and that contributed significantly to its failure to attract the 
people it felt necessary to achieve a mission of salvation, Kōfuku no Kagaku, via its 
participatory seminars and Agonshū via its demonstrative rituals, offered people 
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readily accessible opportunities to take part in their activities and be part of a dynamic 
optimist community, without the need to cut themselves off from the world or 
embrace strict asceticism and a stance of confrontational aggression. As such, their 
mechanisms of engagement enabled them to remain accessible and attractive.  
 
By contrast Aum clearly failed to develop strategies for mass recruitment or for 
dealing with the failures of its mission to recruit. Neither did it manage to develop an 
engaged public persona and sense of community with Japanese society. Rather, by 
becoming internalised, focused on austerities and individual spiritual elevation that 
not so much removed all moral barriers to violence but actually gave the act of 
violence an enhanced spiritual meaning, Aum intensified the potential for violence 
innate in its millennial messages. Rather than managing to raise the spectre of 
catastrophe and thereby enhance its appeal (as Kōfuku no Kagaku did) or posit a 
potential transformation allied to manageable ritual processes aimed at the resolution 
of the problem as with Agonshū, Aum could only increase the polarisation it 
postulated. While earlier Japanese millennial movements and several late twentieth 
century new religions with millennial traits, were able thereby to distance themselves 
from the dramas of prophecy and from any necessity for violence as a catalyst or 
facilitating agency for the new daw, Aum went the other way. It turned itself into a 
'cultural enclave', building communes and encouraging devotees to leave their 
families, abandon their family names and withdraw wholly into a communal lifestyle 
that made the boundaries between Aum and Japanese society increasingly rigid. This 
in turn increased the potential for conflict between itself and those beyond its 
boundaries; Aum's communes became a recurrent arena of conflict between the 
movement and its rural neighbours.  
Nu
ma
ta 
Co
nf
ere
nc
e i
n B
ud
dh
ist
 St
ud
ies
 at
 th
e U
ni
ve
rsi
ty
 of
 H
aw
ai‘
i a
t M
ān
oa
, M
ar
ch
 20
–2
1, 
20
14
 
Vi
ole
nc
e, 
No
nv
iol
en
ce,
 an
d J
ap
an
ese
 R
eli
gio
ns
: P
as
t, 
Pr
ese
nt
, a
nd
 Fu
tu
re 
Pl
ea
se 
ac
kn
ow
led
ge
 th
e s
ou
rce
 of
 th
is 
pa
pe
r a
nd
 do
 no
t q
uo
te 
wi
th
ou
t t
he
 au
th
or
's 
pe
rm
iss
ion
 21 
 
In this context Aum had much more in common with groups outside of Japan that 
constructed communal enclaves and developed a catastrophic millennialism that 
engulfed the entire world, and in which the terrain they occupied was the flashpoint of 
confrontation and of conflict that would bring about the new age along with the 
punishment of the unworthy. Such themes can be seen in movements such as the 
Peoples Temple, the Order of the Solar Temple, Heaven's Gate and the Branch 
Dravidians, all of which have been discussed by numerous scholars as examples, 
along with Aum, as examples of a genre of catastrophic millennialism that led to a 
series of violent confrontations and internal examples of violence in the last decades 
of the twentieth century. Indeed, in such contexts Aum, if it is to be seen as in any 
way representative, had much more in common with these movements than it did with 
other Japanese millennial movements of the era in which it emerged.  
 
Concluding comments  
Aum—even if it started out as more optimistically/progressively inclined—fitted 
squarely into the category of catastrophic millennialism because of its insistence that a 
cataclysm was necessary before any new age could appear. Conversely, Kōfuku no 
Kagaku provides an example of how such categories can be fluid, with catastrophe 
interwoven with strands of optimism, and with particular emphasis on Japan's chosen 
position leading it to eschew violent confrontation in Japan or with the society it 
marked out as the chosen vehicle for the realisation of the new age. It was able to 
recalibrate its position and emphasise an increasingly optimistic stance, turning from a 
largely catastrophic towards an increasingly progressive millennial mode, while Aum 
became increasingly catastrophic and imploded into untrammelled violence.  
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Studies of millennialism in various traditions have indicated a common tendency in 
rhetorical terms to express and expect violence, whether as a precursor to an expected 
new realm or as a necessary element in the attainment of that realm. Yet while such 
imagery—of worlds overturned and rebuilt—might be a theme in millennial teachings 
and visions and a recurrent image in the pronouncements of a wide variety of 
millennial movements, the numbers that either advocate violence consistently and 
actively or that engage in it (either internally, as suicide/transit or as an eradicating 
process to destroy those seen as standing against the realisation of the millennium) are 
rare. This point has been made scholars who have noted that while Christian 
millennialism contains within it various images and expectations of violence, only a 
few have actually moved from the use of images of violence into its actualisation. 
Similarly, despite the images of violence prevalent in Islamic millennial and 
apocalyptic literature, the actual cases of millennially-inspired Islamic violent action 
are rather few and far between. 
  
Scholars of twentieth and early twenty-first century millennial new religions have 
made this point repeatedly as well; the very fact that the same few cases (Aum, 
Peoples Temple, Branch Dravidians, the Order of the Solar Temple and Heaven's 
Gate) continue to be the focus of our studies is evidence of the rarity of such violent 
denouements even in an area (very new, hence highly volatile) that most scholars 
perceive as being most susceptible to dramatic and radical upheavals. As I have 
indicated, despite the fears about the 'danger' of religion and concerns about 
'doomsday cults' and the 'next Aum' , the reality is that after Aum there has been 
rather little radical religious upheaval, and that groups identified under this rubric, 
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such as Panawave, have proved to be harmless, eccentric and out of step with society, 
rather than public threats.  
 
The reality is that using the example of Aum to underpin these images is to use the 
singular case as an universal indicator, when one can find far more evidence from 
among the Japanese new religions to show that millennial groups in general, even 
when they articulate violent images in their rhetoric, have the capacity and 
mechanisms to steer away from violence and conflict and to be peaceful and benign. 
Aum contained within it what, for Japan, were a rather unique set of characteristics 
that differed from its millennial rivals of the late 1980s and early 1990s, and while it 
certainly manifests parallels with other groups beyond Japan and is evidence of the 
ways in which under certain circumstances millennial movements can generate from 
within a culture of violence, it stands alone in Japan. In that context it is rather ironic 
that it has so significantly set the agenda and shaped the conditions within which 
religion is perceived and within which religious groups operate in the present day, 
when other movements from within the same era of Japanese millennialism suggest 
that religion, despite its potential for violence, may not necessarily be as dangerous as 
public opinion and the media suggest.  
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